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Abstract
Damage compensation claims in case of cartels are supposed to increase deter-
rence, compensate losses and increase efficiency. I show that such claims can instead
have adverse effects: If suppliers or buyers of cartelists are compensated in propor-
tion to the profits lost due to the cartel, expected cartel profits can increase. Claims
of downstream firms against upstream cartelists who do not monopolize the market
increase consumer prices. Suppliers of cartelists can be worse off when eligible to
compensation. These results apply also to abuses of dominance and call for a more
careful approach towards the private enforcement of competition law.
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1 Introduction
The European Court of Justice stated in Courage (2001) and Manfredi (2006) that ev-
erybody can claim compensation for the damages actually incurred due to competition
law infringements.1 Backed by these decisions, the European Commission (2005, 2008)
has expressed its intention to facilitate private enforcement. The Commission aims at
improving deterrence, efficiency, and corrective justice by enabling compensation of those
who suffered losses. It has stressed that it aims at full compensation, taking into account
lost profits and not only the overcharge that customers of cartelists have to pay. By
showing that the overcharge is often a poor estimate of actual purchaser damages, Han,
Schinkel and Tuinstra (2008) underline that accounting for quantity effects and pass on is
important to calculate the appropriate compensation. Indeed, full compensation of actual
damages is also put forward in the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament
and of the Council of June 2013.2
With this paper, I add to the discussion by showing that facilitating the compensa-
tion of actual damages (Lost Profit Compensation, LPC) can instead increase consumer
prices, increase the expected profits of cartelists and even decrease the expected profits of
suppliers to cartelists. The main assumption underlying the model is that the cartelists
and their trade partners rationally anticipate the compensation payments when trading.
Informally speaking, this means that there needs to be at least some suspicion in the
industry that there could be a cartel and that damage claims have a chance to succeed.
Though framed in terms of horizontal cartels, the present analysis applies analogously to
excessive pricing of dominant firms.
To derive the results, I use a simple vertical model where downstream firms sell to
consumers and need homogenous inputs, which are offered by two upstream firms and a
competitive fringe. The fringe should be understood broadly as any alternative source
such as the world market or in-house production. I study the effects of the LPC in
case of both upstream and downstream cartels. I begin with the case that the upstream
firms form a cartel by fixing their sales prices and that the downstream firms can claim
compensation for the profits lost due to the upstream cartel. The compensation payments
are modeled as a probabilistic process which can, for example, be interpreted as follow-on
lawsuits after a public detection. For the case in which sourcing from the competitive
fringe is attractive (i.e., it is relatively efficient), I initially assume that claims are valid
only if the claimants actually trade with the cartelists. This is plausible because when
trade with a cartelist has not taken place, it appears very difficult to prove that trade
would have taken place, were there no cartel.3 There are two interesting effects of LPC
claims in this case.
First, consumer prices increase when downstream firms are entitled to LPC claims
1ECJ, Decision of 20th September 2001, C-453/99 Courage Ltd. v. Crehan and Cases C-295/04 to
C-298/04 Vincenzo Manfredi v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA, 13 July 2006. See Wagner (2007) for a
legal discussion. In line with this, the Federal Court of Justice of Germany (BGH) based a cartel damage
decision on the norm that those who suffered losses should be compensated accordingly (Decision of 29th
June 2011 – KZR 75/10).
2See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2013:0404:FIN:EN:PDF.
3Note, however, that downstream firms sourcing from the efficient upstream firms in case of upstream
competition is the right counter-factual.
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against upstream cartelists. The reason is that once a downstream firm expects a positive
LPC, it is willing to purchase from the cartelists at input prices above the competitive
fringe cost. Hence the cartelists increase input prices and, in best response to that, con-
sumer prices increase as well. This result is sustained with two-part tariffs as long as
exclusivity clauses are not enforceable and there is sufficient price competition down-
stream.
Second, the expected cartel profits can increase when LPC claims are in place. The
reason is that the claims relax the constraints of the contracting problem between the
upstream cartelists and each downstream firm. Hence, the industry profits increase and
the cartelists can appropriate part of that.
Without a competitive fringe, instead, purchaser claims against an upstream cartel
reduce consumer prices, hurt the cartelists, and benefit the downstream firms – if upstream
tariffs are linear. This is in line with common sense of how private enforcement should
work. With two-part tariffs, however, consumer prices are not affected and claimants do
not gain in expected value.4
In the second part of this paper I investigate the LPC in case of downstream car-
tels. This case is interesting because in principle everybody can claim compensation for
the damages suffered from a competition law infringement. This includes suppliers of
cartelists. Although there is not yet an established practice for these cases in Europe,
they will potentially be more relevant once private enforcement becomes more common.5
From both an academic and a policy perspective, it is therefore interesting to study the
implications of facilitating supplier damage compensations with respect to social welfare
goals. Towards this I consider the case that downstream firms jointly fix their sales prices
(cartelize). For each downstream firm there is one efficient supplier. Suppliers compete
and can claim compensation for damages due to the cartel.
A damage occurs to suppliers when the downstream cartelists order less quantity.
Additionally, a downstream cartel tends to exert pressure on the upstream margins. The
reason is that when jointly maximizing profits, the downstream firms tend to pass on cost
increases for one product to a larger extent than it would be the case under imperfect
competition. Hence, upstream firms have more individual incentives to lower their prices
in case of a downstream cartel. The LPC accounts for these damages.
The LPC rule, however, adds another effect that is detrimental to suppliers, when
compared to the situation with a cartel and no compensation rule. Upstream firms have
to additionally lower their prices to compensate downstream cartelists for expected com-
pensation payments when trading with them, as otherwise the cartelists source from the
fringe. Yet the lower marginal input prices of the efficient upstream firms, the more at-
tractive it is for the cartelists to source only one input from the fringe, by that save one
expected damage obligation, and order more from the other upstream firm at the reduced
price. Hence the upstream firms need to lower their prices even more, which benefits the
cartelists, but hurts the suppliers. This yields a surprising finding: Entitling suppliers
4This finding indicates that the assumption of linear tariffs, made in essentially all articles on cartel
damages, is not innocuous and its consequences not yet fully investigated in this literature. See for
instance Baker (1988); Besanko and Spulber (1990); Boone and Müller (2011); Han et al. (2008); Hellwig
(2007); Salant (1987); Schinkel et al. (2008); Spiller (1986); Verboven and Dijk (2009).
5See Han et al. (2008) for a discussion of US cases.
2
of cartelists to claim damage compensations can actually decrease the expected profits
of the claimants below the level that would result were there a cartel and no private en-
forcement. In other words, it may not even be desirable for suppliers to have the right to
sue.
2 Related literature
This paper is most closely related to Salant (1987) and Baker (1988) who have pointed
out that this Overcharge Compensation (OCC) may not be effective if the compensation
payment is anticipated by cartelists and buyers when trading. The reason is that the
OCC constitutes a discount paid by cartelists to buyers, which is perfectly compensated
by an increase in the cartel price. Hence, expected prices as well as profits of cartelists
and buyers are not affected by the presence of private enforcement.6
Baker suggests that an efficient compensation should rather be proportional to actual
losses.7 Indeed, compensating in proportion to actual losses is in line with results about
efficient deterrence (Landes, 1983) and a common principle in civil law. The actual loss
of a downstream firm due to excessive input prices equals the difference in downstream
equilibrium profits as a result of different upstream prices. This encompasses pass-on of
increased input prices, adjustments in quantities as well as competitive reactions, whereas
the OCC is simply a multiple of the actual quantity purchased from at the excessive price
times the price overcharge. As described in the Introduction, I show that compensating for
actual losses (i.e. the Lost Profit Compensation, LPC) can instead have adverse effects on
cartel profits, allocative efficiency, and effective compensation. In other words, I demon-
strate that in cases where the OCC has at worst no effect, the LPC actually increases the
undesired effects of an infringement. This result is obtained for typical industry structures
with up- and downstream competition where contracting with externalities occurs (Segal,
1999). The LPC rule enables firms to write supply contracts that increase industry profits
to the benefit of infringers, when compared to no compensation rule.
The main point which the present paper adds to the literature is that facilitating pri-
vate compensation claims for profits lost due cartels or excessive pricing of dominant firms
can have, surprisingly, distinctively undesirable effects because more profitable supply
contracts become feasible. These effects include higher consumer prices, higher expected
cartel profits and even a decrease in the expected profits of the damaged firms, when
compared to no compensation rule.
Somewhat related is Harrington (2004, 2005) who investigates in a dynamic setting the
pricing of cartelists when these fear to raise suspicion about the cartel’s existence. Har-
rington shows that under specific conditions, higher cartel prices can result when public
fines are higher (2004) and when the but-for-price price used for calculating damages is
lower (2005). The reasoning for the first effect is that public fines can stabilize a car-
tel and thus allow for higher prices. The reasoning for the second effect is that a lower
but-for-price increases the Overcharge Compensation to be paid, i.e., the quantity sold
times the overcharge. To decrease that overcharge compensation, the cartelists may want
6This neutrality result can fail for several reasons, see Section 6.
7See his Theorem 3.
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to increase the cartel price to decrease the quantity sold. These mechanisms are clearly
different from those analyzed in the static framework of this paper.
More generally, by investigating private damage compensation claims, the present pa-
per adds to the literature on optimal private and public enforcement of competition law,
see Segal and Whinston (2006) for an overview. One focus of that literature is on the
use of private information for law enforcement. An advantage of private enforcement may
arise if private parties are better informed about infringements than the authority. Yet the
objectives of private agents to initiate lawsuits generally differ from social welfare objec-
tives. For instance, with private enforcement there can be incentives for private claimants
to delay actions that induce a cartel breakdown if additional compensation payments ex-
ceed additional losses (Spiller, 1986). In a related vein, Schinkel et al. (2008) show that
cartelists can bribe direct purchasers to not whistle-blow the cartel, to the detriment of
indirect purchasers. Another concern is that private parties can have incentives to initi-
ate socially detrimental lawsuits. McAfee et al. (2008) show that remuneration of private
agents for providing hints that help the authority to detect anti-competitive behavior may
be better than establishing private damage claims. In a similar spirit, Polinsky and Che
(1991) suggest that part of a damage payment should not be paid to the claimant, but to
the treasury. Such a decoupling can achieve both a high deterrence and avoid excessive
lawsuits. Moreover, Baker (1988) points out that the cartel profitability tends to be lower
if damage payments are payable to the treasury. The reason is that the price adjustments,
which counterbalance the implicit discounts that accrue to the cartelists’ trade partners,
disappear. I show that such a decoupling can hurt suppliers of cartelists who nevertheless
need to reduce their prices to remain attractive.
3 Framework
Two upstream firms U1 and U2 supply homogenous products at constant marginal costs
normalized to 0. Two symmetric downstream firms D1 and D2 can transform these
upstream products one-to-one into final products.8 Alternatively to sourcing inputs from
U1 or U2, each downstream firm can source equivalent inputs from a competitive fringe
at a marginal price c > 0.9 The game is structured as follows:
1. Each supplier Ui, i ∈ {1, 2}, offers tariffs with unit prices wi to both downstream
firms.
2. Each downstream firm Di, i ∈ {1, 2},
(a) observes all input prices,
(b) publicly accepts or rejects the tariff offers,
(c) sets the sale price pi,
(d) sources inputs, produces and sells to consumers demanding qi(pi, p−i) units.
8Note that symmetry is not necessary for the analysis, but simplifies the exposition.
9The assumptions imply that the input is essential and correspond to a fixed proportions technology
such as Leontief.
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3. If there is a cartel, with probability α ∈ [0, 1) the cartelists have to pay compensa-
tion.
In Section 4, I study the case that upstream firms cartelize and downstream firms compete,
and in Section 5 the reverse: upstream firms compete and downstream firms cartelize. All
firms are risk neutral. Competitive prices maximize individual profits, whereas upstream
(downstream) cartel prices maximize joint profits of U1 and U2 (D1 and D2). With
this I abstract from the questions of how the cartel is stabilized – one may assume that
cartelists are sufficiently patient to play trigger strategies – and why there is a cartel
instead of implicit collusion. See Subsection 6.2 for a discussion on cartel stability. It
is common knowledge whether there is a cartel. This assumption is not necessary in its
strict form and relaxed in Subsection 6.1.
Similar to Baker (1988) and Salant (1987), the game structure reduces cartel detection
and lawsuits to an exogenous process. This is done mainly for tractability, but also appears
justifiable, as follow-on suits of public investigations play a major role for private damage
compensation. The probability α with which the cartelists have to pay compensation is
nevertheless allowed to increase in the cartel price for most of the analysis. For instance,
a higher cartel price may ease the burden of proof in a lawsuit and thus increase its
success rate. The probability α is common knowledge in the baseline model. Information
asymmetries between cartelists and claimants about α are investigated in Subsection 6.1.
4 Upstream cartel
Assume for this section that upstream firms U1 and U2 cartelize to maximize joint profits,
whereas D1 and D2 set prices non-cooperatively. I only analyze damage claims of the
direct purchasers D1 and D2. This appears to be the by far most relevant case as indirect
purchasers, in particular consumers, often lack both knowledge and damage volume to
consider lawsuits. In the first three subsections I study linear tariffs. Two part tariffs
follow in Subsection 4.4.
The profit of downstream firm i when sourcing at unit price wi is given by (pi − wi) qi,
yielding the first order condition for pi of
(
pi − wi
) ∂qi
∂pi
+ qi = 0, i ∈ {1, 2}. (1)
Assume that for the relevant input costs {wi, w−i} there are unique equilibrium down-
stream prices p∗(wi, w−i) for each firm i, characterized by (1). Let p(w) ≡ p∗i (wi =
w,w−i = w) and q(w) ≡ qi(p(w), p(w)). Denote the equilibrium downstream profits
without any compensation payment by pi(wi, w−i) ≡ (p∗i − wi)qi(p∗i , p∗−i) and pi(w) ≡
pi(wi = w,w−i = w). To have a simple expression for the effect of an increase in
the upstream price level, denote pi′(w) ≡
[
∂pi(w1,w2)
∂w1 +
∂pi(w1,w2)
∂w2
]
w1=w2=w
and p′(w) ≡[
∂p∗(w1,w2)
∂w1 +
∂p∗(w1,w2)
∂w2
]
w1=w2=w
. Moreover, impose
Assumption 1. The downstream profit pi(w) decreases and the downstream price level
p(w) increases in the upstream price level w: pi′(w) < 0 and p′(w) > 0.
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That profits decrease in the input price level is generally the case for downstream mo-
nopolies and highly plausible for competition, though not necessary.10 The price increase
holds under standard regularity conditions, as does
Assumption 2. If downstream products are substitutable (∂qi/∂p−i > 0), the profit of
downstream firm i increases in the input price of firm −i: ∂pi(wi, w−i)/∂w−i > 0.
Let wN denote the competitive upstream price. A downstream firm’s profit in case
of upstream competition is given by pi(wN). For instance, with Bertrand competition,
the upstream equilibrium prices equal the marginal costs of 0 and downstream profits
equal pi(0). Note that the assumption of Bertrand competition is not necessary: any
non-cooperative price below the monopoly level yields the same qualitative results.
4.1 Lost profit compensation
The downstream profit lost due to an upstream cartel is the difference between the equi-
librium downstream profits earned under upstream competition and upstream carteliza-
tion.11 The counter-factual profit of a downstream firm in case of upstream competition,
pi(wN), is assumed to be common knowledge of the firms; the profit under the cartel is
yet to be determined.
The LPC to downstream firm i when sourcing from the cartelists at a price wi is given
by
LPCi ≡ max
{
0,
[
pi(wN)−
(
pi − wi
)
qi (pi, p−i)
]}
, (2)
where pi(wN) is the counter-factual profit absent a cartel and (pi − wi) qi the actual down-
stream profit in the presence of a cartel. The LPC is paid with probability α,12 so the
expected total profit of a downstream firm is
Πi ≡
(
pi − wi
)
qi (pi, p−i) + αLPCi. (3)
Note that α = 0 is equivalent to no compensation rule, i.e. LPCi = 0 ∀ i. For LPCi > 0,
substituting from (2) yields
Πi =
[(
pi − wi
)
qi (pi, p−i)
]
(1− α) + pi(wN)α. (4)
Note that the first term consists of the operational profit scaled down by 1 − α, as with
a profit tax of α. Differentiation of (4) with respect to pi yields the first order conditions
stated in (1), independent of α. Hence the translation from upstream to downstream
prices is unaffected by whether a LPC rule is in place (α > 0) or not (α = 0) and given
by p(w) for uniform upstream prices of w.
10Downstream profits decrease in the uniform input price w in case of downstream substitutes if demand
qi does not become less own price sensitive when the price level increases, e.g., if demand is linear.
11One may generally ask whether comparing the equilibrium outcomes is the appropriate standard.
Though logically sound, one can argue that a reduction in lost profits of a claimant resulting from the
cartelists’ increase of the claimant’s competitors’ input costs should not reduce the claim. For a further
discussion along these lines see Hellwig (2007).
12The solution does not change if one scales the LPC by a positive factor µ, such as 3 for treble damages,
as long as αµ < 1. Using the normalization µ = 1 throughout reduces notation.
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The two upstream firms fix a cartel price of w. The upstream cartel profit when both
downstream firms source all inputs from the cartelists is given by
ΠU ≡ 2w q(w)− α ∑
i∈{1,2}
LPCi = 2
{
w q(w)− α
[
pi(wN)− pi(w)
]}
. (5)
For α > 0 and a positive cartel overcharge w − wN , the expected LPC is positive and
reduces the cartel profit for all relevant w. The factual downstream profit pi(w) enters
the cartel profits positively, so the cartelists partly internalize the downstream profits.
This effect is the same as with forward integration. As downstream profits decrease in
the cartel price (Assumption 1), the marginal cartel profit
∂ΠU
∂w
= 2
{
q(w) + w q′(w)−
[
α′(w)
(
pi(wN)− pi(w)
)
− α(w) pi′(w)
]}
(6)
is lower with the compensation rule (equivalently: α > 0) than without it (α = 0). This
is the case even if the probability of a compensation payment is exogenous (α′(w) = 0)
because ∂2ΠU
∂w∂α
= pi′(w) < 0. If the probability increases in the cartel price (α′(w) > 0),
the marginal cartel profit is reduced further (see (6)). Overall, marginal cartel profits are
lower with a compensation rule in place.
No competitive fringe.
A downstream firm only buys from the cartelists if its expected profit when sourcing from
the cartelists is weakly higher than when it sources from the fringe at a price of c. For
c sufficiently large and under the assumption that cartel profits are strictly concave, the
FOC ∂ΠU
∂w
= 0 uniquely characterizes the optimal cartel price, denoted by wK . If α > 0, the
cartelists fix a lower price wK than if α = 0.13 As p′(w) > 0, also consumer prices p(wK)
are lower for α > 0. Analogously, expected downstream profits, (1− α)pi(wK) + αpi(wN),
are higher for α > 0 than the downstream profits pi(wK) that result for α = 0. Hence
Proposition 1. Without a competitive fringe (c sufficiently large) and with linear tariffs,
when compared to no compensation rule, consumer prices and upstream cartel profits are
strictly lower, whereas expected downstream profits are strictly higher under the LPC rule.
See Figure 1 for an illustration (please disregard the dashed vertical lines for now).
With the LPC, the cartel profit shifts down and to the left. Hence its maximizer also
shifts to the left with the LPC and the expected cartel profit decreases.
Competitive fringe.
Consider now that there is an attractive competitive fringe, i.e., c is sufficiently small such
that absent a compensation rule (α = 0) the cartelists fix the maximal price of c. To make
the problem interesting, assume that the competitive price wN is strictly below c. For
instance, with Bertrand competition, wN = 0. Let us first focus on the case that single
sourcing is necessary, either because suppliers offer exclusive contracts or for technological
13The implicit function theorem yields dw/dα = − ∂2ΠU∂w∂α/ ∂
2ΠU
∂w∂w . By assumption,
∂2ΠU
∂w∂w < 0 and
∂2ΠU
∂w∂α =
pi′(w) < 0.
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reasons. Without exclusivity, qualitatively equivalent results are obtained, see Subsection
4.3.
Recall the assumption that a downstream firm can only claim a LPC if it actually
sources from the cartelists. If one downstream firm sources from a cartelist at a price of
w, the expected profit of the other downstream firm from doing the same must be at least
as high as the profit of sourcing from the fringe at a price of c:
pi(w,w) + α
[
pi(wN , wN)− pi(w,w)
]
≥ pi(c, w). (7)
For α > 0 and w = c, the incentive compatibility constraint (7) reduces to pi(wN , wN) ≥
pi(c, c), which holds with strict inequality as pi′(w) < 0 by Assumption 1. Hence the
cartelists can raise w above c until (7) holds with equality. This implies an equilibrium
cartel price wK > c and consumer prices exceeding the price level p(c) which results
without any compensation rule. Intuitively, the cartelists can demand a higher marginal
price because in expectation the buyers receive a fixed fee. This is similar to the logic
of slotting fees (Shaffer, 1991). Note that when compared to no compensation, the LPC
rule reduces consumer surplus!
Total equilibrium downstream profits equal the value of sourcing from the fringe, i.e.,
the right hand side of (7) evaluated at w = wK , i.e. pi(c, wK). If downstream products
are independent (∂qi/∂p−i = 0), this profit equals the profit without an LPC. With
substitutes (∂qi/∂p−i > 0), this profit is strictly higher, so competing downstream firms
benefit from the LPC rule.
What happens to cartel profits? Without the LPC, the cartel price equals c. The
first order effect of introducing an LPC is a decrease in the expected cartel profits in
(5). Yet, cartelists can charge a price above c once the LPC is in place. Indeed, in
expectation the LPC works like an upfront payment that the upstream cartelists pay to
downstream firms. In return, the cartelists can implement higher unit prices w which
affect downstream prices and, in turn, industry profits.
Although expected downstream profits are never lower with the LPC than without it,
upstream firms can nevertheless benefit in expectation through an increase in industry
profits. For this to occur, there must be downstream competition and a relatively efficient
fringe, so that without the LPC downstream prices are below the industry profit maxi-
mizing level. Using a linear demand specification, one can show that expected upstream
cartel profits can indeed increase once downstream competition is sufficiently strong.14
Proposition 2. Let the upstream cartel charge linear tariffs and c be sufficiently small.
Compared to no compensation rule, with the LPC rule both input and consumer prices are
strictly higher; downstream profits are higher for downstream substitutes, and unchanged
for independent products; expected cartel profits can be higher.
See again Figure 1 for an illustration. With the LPC, a higher cartel price is feasible
as the fringe constraint shifts to the right. Although the profit function with the LPC is
lower, the maximal expected cartel profits can thus be higher with the LPC than without
it. This possibility is illustrated by point b being above point a.
14Using the specification qi = 0.5− (β+γ) pi+γ p−i, β, γ > 0, for parameter values β = 1, α = 0.1, c =
0.05, the cartelists are in expectation better off once γ exceeds approximately 1.9, i.e., downstream
substitutability is sufficiently high.
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Figure 1: Upstream cartel profits. With a Lost Profit Compensation (LPC) of downstream
firms, (marginal) cartel profits are lower, but the fringe constraint is relaxed.
Let us briefly summarize the findings. For the case that the upstream firms can
monopolize the input market (c large), Proposition 1 states that the LPC rule decreases
cartel prices, decreases expected cartel profits and benefits the downstream firms as well as
consumers. This is in line with what common sense tells us. Instead, when the upstream
cartel does not monopolize the input market, Proposition 2 states that essentially the
opposite can happen: Cartel and consumer prices increase, expected cartel profits can
increase and downstream firms may not benefit from the LPC rule. The reason is that
the LPC works like a slotting fee: because in expectation the downstream firms receive a
compensation payment, they are still willing to buy from the cartelists at an input price
which is above the competitive fringe price of c.
4.2 Overcharge compensation
With the Overcharge Compensation (OCC), a downstream firm is only compensated for
the overcharge on each unit bought. Formally, the OCC of downstream firm i is given by
OCCi ≡ (w − wN) qi(pi, p−i), (8)
with w denoting the uniform upstream cartel price and wN the counter-factual competitive
price, with wN ≤ w.15
Salant (1987) and Baker (1988) have shown that the OCC is neutral if there is no
competitive fringe (c large). In case of the LPC, however, we have seen that the results
crucially depend on whether there is a competitive fringe (c small vs. large). Let us
15In principle, nothing changes when scaling the OCC by a factor such as 3 for triple damages; see
footnote 16 for details.
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therefore briefly study the OCC for both cases, so that we can compare it with the LPC.
Using (8), the total expected profit of a downstream firm in case of the OCC reduces to
Πi = (pi − w (1− α)) qi(pi, p−i).
Given w, the (expected) marginal costs of a downstream firm decrease as α increases.
The FOC of downstream profits with respect to pi is
qi + (pi − w (1− α)) ∂qi
∂pi
= 0. (9)
The upstream cartelists anticipate the effect of w on p when maximizing the joint expected
profits ∑
i
[w qi − αOCCi] = w (1− α)
∑
i
qi (10)
with respect to w. Denote the effective input price by wˆ ≡ w · (1−α) and substitute it in
(9) and (10) to observe that the expressions reduce to the ones without any compensation
rule (obtained by setting α = 0), only now with wˆ instead of w.
No competitive fringe.
Without an attractive competitive fringe (i.e. with c sufficiently large), the effective input
price that maximizes cartel profits is again given by wˆ = wM ≡ arg maxw w · q(w). The
resulting consumer prices are given by p(wM) and equal the equilibrium prices absent any
compensation rule.16 Hence the expected upstream and downstream profits, as well as
consumer surplus, are the same under the OCC and no compensation rule.
This neutrality result holds also if α increases in w. An increased probability of a
compensation payment lowers the expected input price of a purchaser and raises the
cartelists’ expected compensation obligations, but this change is perfectly compensated
through an increase in the nominal cartel price.
Competitive fringe.
Let us now consider the case that there is an attractive competitive fringe (c sufficiently
small). A downstream firm will simply source all inputs where the expected costs are
lowest. With no compensation when sourcing from the fringe, the effective cartel price
is lower than the alternative sourcing costs if w (1 − α(w)) ≤ c. Thus the cartelists will
raise w until this condition holds with equality. In turn, the optimal nominal cartel price
wOCC is above c, but the effective marginal input costs of downstream firms equal c and
consumer prices equal p(c) as without any compensation rule. Hence the neutrality of the
OCC is sustained.
16The optimal “nominal” cartel price wOCC is obtained by solving wOCC = wM/(1− α(wOCC)). The
condition has a solution if maxw wˆ(w) ≥ wM , i.e., if it is possible to raise the effective input price to
the monopoly level. This is clearly the case if α(w) < 1∀w ≥ 0. If α(w) reaches 1 before the previous
condition holds, the optimal cartel price is lower and given by arg maxw wˆ(w) (cf. Salant, 1987). This
can in particular be the case if α is not just a probability, but includes a damage multiplier above 1, see
footnote 12.
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Proposition 3. Let the upstream cartel charge linear tariffs. With the OCC rule, both
expected input and consumer prices as well as expected up- and downstream profits are as
with no compensation rule, i.e., the OCC is neutral, independent of the magnitude of c.
Whereas the LPC has adverse effects when there is an attractive competitive fringe
(c small), but beneficial effects otherwise (c large), the OCC is just neutral in both cases.
This finding is interesting because the only difference is in how the damage compensation
is calculated: the OCC accounts for the cartel overcharge on each unit bought, whereas
the LPC accounts also for losses from foregone sales and pass on.
Towards an intuition, recall that with linear tariffs, up- and downstream firms can
write contracts that perfectly counterbalance the OCC as it is linear in quantity. This
results in neutrality. Instead, the LPC introduces a non-linearity similar to a slotting fee,
which effectively changes the linear to particular non-linear tariffs. Allowing for two-part
tariffs indeed neutralizes the effects of the LPC when the cartel monopolizes the input
market. Interestingly, we will see in Subsection 4.4 that the adverse effects of the LPC
persist with two-part tariffs if the competitive fringe is relatively efficient and contracts
are non-exclusive.
4.3 Non-exclusive linear upstream tariffs
In Subsection 4.1 I assumed supply contracts to be exclusive: a buyer had to source all
inputs from one supplier. In this subsection I show that Proposition 2 on the LPC also
holds for non-exclusive linear contracts, with non-exclusive meaning that downstream
firms are not restricted in sourcing (additional) inputs from the competitive fringe.
As before, I assume that there is no LPC when sourcing from the fringe (this assump-
tion is relaxed in Subsection 4.5). This implies that a downstream firm which sources some
inputs alternatively is not compensated for these expenses, although they are above the
counter-factual expenses which would result with no upstream cartel. Consequently, the
LPC is computed as if the inputs actually sourced from the fringe would have also been
sourced from the fringe were there no cartel. Thus the counter-factual downstream profits
equal pi(wN)− c (1− β) qi, where (1− β) denotes the fraction of inputs actually sourced
from the fringe, and consequently β the fraction actually sourced from the cartelists.
The actual operational profit of a downstream firm is
pii ≡ [pi − β w − (1− β) c] qi. (11)
A downstream firm’s expected profit for a positive LPC is17
Πi = pii + α
[
pi(wN)− (1− β) c qi − pii
]
= (1− α) pii + α
[
pi(wN)− (1− β) c qi
]
= (1− α) [pi − β w − (1− β) c] qi + α
[
pi(wN)− (1− β) c qi
]
= (1− α)
[
pi − β w − (1− β) c 11− α
]
qi + αpi(wN).
17The argument w of α is dropped here for brevity. The results do not depend on whether α′ is zero
or positive as long as α > 0.
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As can be easily seen when differentiating the last line with respect to β and setting w = c,
downstream profits increase in the fraction β of inputs sourced from the cartelists at equal
prices as this lowers expected damages. The cartelists can thus raise w up to c/(1 − α)
without losing sales to the fringe. The cartelists also have to ensure that a downstream
firm does not deviate to source all inputs from the fringe and earn a deviation profit
of pi(c, w), as with exclusive tariffs.18 Independent of which constraint is stricter, for
c sufficiently small, the optimal cartel price is above c, yielding consumer prices above
p(c) also with non-exclusive contracts. As a downstream firm can assure itself a profit of
pi(c, wK) by sourcing all inputs from the fringe, it is better off under the LPC if downstream
products are substitutes and not worse off otherwise, similar to the case with exclusive
contracts in Subsection 4.1.
4.4 Two-part tariffs
Assume now that the suppliers U1 and U2 offer to each downstream firm a two-part
tariff with a marginal price w as before and additionally a fixed fee F that needs to be
paid upon acceptance of the contract. Maintain the assumption entertained so far that
sourcing from the fringe yields no compensation claim.19 When both downstream firms
source inputs from the cartelists, each earns an expected profit of
Πi(w,F ) = pi(w,w)− F + α [piN − (pi(w,w)− F )] , (12)
with piN denoting the counter-factual downstream profit without an upstream cartel.20
If Di accepts a (non-exclusive) contract and sources one more unit of input from the
fringe instead of from a cartelist, it has a direct cost saving of w − c, but its expected
compensation is reduced by αw due to the assumption of no compensation for sourcing
from the fringe. This is the same logic as with linear tariffs in Subsection 4.3. Hence the
downstream firm optimally sources all inputs from the cartelists if w ≤ c /(1 − α). The
cartelists’ problem is to
max
F,w
ΠU = 2 [w q(w) + F ]− α∑
i
LPCi (13)
s.t. Πi(w,F ) ≥ pi(c, w)∀i, (14)
w ≤ c/(1− α). (15)
The participation constraints in (14) clearly have to hold with equality as otherwise the
cartelists could profitably raise F . The no arbitrage condition (15) is relevant in case
contracts do not contain exclusivity clauses such that for w > c /(1 − α) and F < 0,
purchasers could profitably cash F , but actually source from the fringe.
18Intuitively, if a marginal deviation is not profitable, a discrete deviation, which additionally implies
a discrete decrease of the non-linear compensation component, is not profitable either. This logic should
be valid at least under strategic complementarity in downstream prices because then not accepting the
supply contract of the cartelists and thereby committing to a lower perceived marginal input cost of c
should be detrimental. For strategic substitutes, this may though favor the discrete deviation.
19The relaxation of this assumption is discussed for linear tariffs in Subsection 4.5. A similar logic
applies for two-part tariffs.
20I do not use the notation pi(wN ) as the competitive upstream tariffs are potentially also non-linear
and downstream profits may thus differ.
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Substituting for Πi from (12) in (14), imposing equality and solving for F yields
pi(c, w) = pi(w,w)− F + α [piN − (pi(w,w)− F )]
=⇒ F = pi(w,w) + αpiN − pi(c, w)(1− α) . (16)
Substituting in (13) for LPCi from the brackets in (12) and for F from (16) yields
ΠU = 2 [p(w) q(w)− pi(c, w)] , (17)
which is independent of α. If contracts are exclusive, the no-arbitrage condition (15) is
irrelevant and the problem is thus independent of α. Hence for any c, the LPC has no
effect on expected cartel profits and marginal equilibrium prices wK and pK .
Instead, if contracts are non-exclusive, the no-arbitrage condition (15) is relevant and
downstream firms prefer to source from the fringe once w > c /(1−α). Evaluating ∂ΠU/∂w
at w = c yields that it is positive for sufficiently small c and downstream substitutes.21
For α = 0, the optimal tariff is thus {FK = 0, wK = c} and endogenously linear. For
α > 0, the no-arbitrage constraint is relaxed and a marginal price w > c is feasible and
also profitable for the cartelists if ∂ΠU/∂w > 0 at w = c. Hence without exclusivity
clauses, but with downstream price competition and sufficiently small c, marginal prices
as well as cartel profits are above the levels which would result without am LPC. The
equilibrium downstream profit equals the outside option value pi(c, wK) on the right hand
side of (14) and is higher under the LPC as ∂pi(c, w)/∂w > 0.
Proposition 4. Assume that an upstream cartel uses two-part tariffs. Compared to no
LPC rule,
(i) if there is no competitive fringe or downstream products are not substitutable or
input contracts are exclusive, the LPC is neutral with respect to marginal prices and
expected profits.
(ii) If sourcing from the fringe is sufficiently attractive and input contracts are not
exclusive and downstream products are substitutes, marginal prices and both expected up-
stream cartel and downstream profits increase.
The first part of Proposition 4 nicely relates the neutrality of the OCC with linear
tariffs (Proposition 3): The OCC only imposes a discount that is linear in quantity.
Hence linear tariffs are sufficient to neutralize this discount. Instead, the LPC implies a
non-linear discount which essentially transforms the linear upstream tariffs into two-part
tariffs. This yielded Propositions 1 and 2. With two-part tariffs, the non-linear discount
implied by the LPC can be contracted around again, yielding Proposition 4 (i).
Yet, even with two-part tariffs the cartelists are constrained by the competitive fringe
in their marginal price setting as the downstream firms’ outside options are endogenous
(see (17)). In cases where the cartelists want to set the highest feasible marginal price,
the LPC helps them to sustain even higher prices. This is the same result as before with
linear tariffs in Subsection 4.3 and yields Proposition 4 (ii).
21See Proposition 4 in Hunold et al. (2012). That ∂ΠU/∂w > 0 at w = c depends on the assumption
of downstream price competition.
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4.5 Compensation when sourcing from the competitive fringe
Up to here, a firm was assumed to receive compensation with positive probability only if
it actually traded with the cartelists. Note that compared to the regime with competitive
upstream prices, a damage for a buyer also arises if the upstream cartel prices are so
high that it is best for him to source from the less efficient competitive fringe. Although
it appears difficult to successfully claim cartel damages without having traded with a
cartelist, it is interesting to study the effects of relaxing this assumption. As we will see,
the effectiveness of the compensation rule in reducing consumer prices and decreasing
cartel profits is increased in this case. Facilitating such claims, if possible, is thus a
desirable policy consideration.
Assume that a downstream firm can also claim a LPC if it does not source from the
upstream cartelists. Clearly, relaxing the assumption on alternative compensation is only
interesting if the competitive fringe is relevant (c sufficiently small), as otherwise sourcing
alternatively is not a consideration.
When the linear contracts are exclusive,22 downstream firm Di prefers to source from
the cartelists, given the other firm does so, over sourcing from the fringe if23
pi(w,w) + α(w)LPCi ≥ pi(c, w) + α(w)LPCi. (18)
Condition (18) reduces to
pi(w,w) ≥ pi(c, w), (19)
if LPCi on the right hand side of (18) is either conditioned on w or the actual alternative
input price of c.24 Raising w above c violates (19): each downstream firm then prefers to
source from the fringe, so the equilibrium cartel price is wK = c. In turn, downstream
prices equal p(c) as without a compensation rule.
As input prices do not counterbalance the LPC, the LPC rule clearly implies a redis-
tribution from upstream cartelists to downstream firms, yielding
Proposition 5. Assume that an upstream cartel charges linear tariffs, there is an attrac-
tive competitive fringe (c sufficiently small), and sourcing from the fringe yields the same
LPC as sourcing from the cartelists. When compared to no compensation rule, input and
consumer prices are unchanged, whereas expected downstream profits increase and cartel
profits decrease.
Excursion: Overcharge Compensation.
If a downstream firm receives the OCC also if it sources from the fringe, it buys from an
upstream cartelist only if
w − α(w)w ≤ c− α(w)w.
22The same results can easily be obtained for non-exclusive contracts.
23The assumption implicit in this statement is that the compensation probability α depends on the
cartel price w independently of whether one or both firms actually source from the cartel.
24The reduction is straightforward if LPCi is equal on both sides of (18). Explicitly conditioning
on actual input prices yields pi(w,w) + α(w) [pi(0) − pi(w,w)] ≥ pi(c, w) + α(w) [pi(0) − pi(c, w)] which
equivalently reduces to (19).
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This implies w ≤ c, yielding an optimal nominal cartel price of wK = c.25 Interestingly,
the effective marginal costs of downstream firms now equal c (1 − α(c)) and are strictly
below c for α > 0. Hence granting an OCC to downstream firms also when sourcing from
the fringe yields lower consumer prices and decreases the upstream cartel profitability
compared to no compensation rule.
5 Downstream cartel
Assume now that the downstream firms D1 and D2 fix sales prices to maximize joint
profits. To make this meaningful, assume that the downstream products are substitutes:
∂qi/∂p−i > 0, so downstream firms benefit from a cartel which allows them to internalize
the price externalities. Moreover, assume that demand decreases when all prices increase:
∂qi/∂pi + ∂qi/∂p−i < 0. Maintain the assumption that each supplier can make take-it-or-
leave-it offers in the first stage, so the downstream cartelists can still not directly influence
input prices.
Upstream firms U1 and U2 set prices non-cooperatively and are eligible to claim
compensation from the downstream cartelists, but no claims accrue to the competitive
fringe.26 To study the effects of a downstream cartel on supplier profits, it is necessary
that U1 and U2 can make positive profits. Assume for simplicity that supplier U1 (U2)
can serve D1 (D2) at zero marginal costs as before, but that serving the other downstream
firm is prohibitively costly.
The joint downstream profits when sourcing all input from U1 and U2 at w1 and w2
are given by
ΠD(pi, p−i) ≡
∑
i∈{1,2}
{(
pi − wi
)
qi(pi, p−i)− αLPCi
}
.
Let piN denote the equilibrium profit of a supplier when both up- and downstream prices
are set non-cooperatively. The LPC claim of supplier Ui if selling to Di is
LPCi = max
[
0, piN − wi qi(pi, p−i)
]
.
For LPCi > 0, downstream profits are
ΠD(p1, p2) =
∑
i∈{1,2}
{(
pi − wi (1− α)
)
qi(pi, p−i)− αpiN
}
. (20)
The profit of supplier Ui is
Πi = (1− α)wi qi + αpiN . (21)
25Note that also if the purchaser is compensated with c instead of wK when sourcing from the fringe,
the same results obtain.
26For example, because the fringe firms make zero profits or because the downstream firm’s alternative
is to produce in-house.
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No competitive fringe.
Without a competitive fringe (c sufficiently large), each supplier is the monopolist of its
downstream firm. The suppliers still influence each other indirectly through the effects of
input prices on sales prices and thus input sales.
For now assume that the probability of a due payment is completely exogenous, i.e., α
does not depend on the cartel prices.27 Let w˜i ≡ wi (1−α) and substitute in (20) and (21)
to observe that given w˜i, the marginal profits with respect to the corresponding prices do
not depend on α. Hence the effective equilibrium upstream price, denoted by w˜∗, is not a
function of α, whereas the nominal price solves w∗ = w˜∗/ (1− α (w∗)). The equilibrium
downstream cartel price, denoted by pK , is not affected by the LPC. A supplier’s expected
profit,
Πi = w˜∗qi(pK , pK) + αpiN ,
increases in α by the second term. As pK is invariant in α, downstream cartel profits
must decrease in α.
Proposition 6. Assume that there is a downstream cartel, supplier Ui, i ∈ {1, 2}, is
a monopolist for firm Di using linear tariffs (c sufficiently large), and α is exogenous.
Compared to no compensation rule, the LPC has no effect on consumer prices, benefits
suppliers and decreases cartel profits.
Competitive fringe.
Assume now that the fringe price c is sufficiently small such that absent any compensation
rule, it is optimal for each supplier to charge c both in case of a downstream cartel and
downstream competition.28 At equal input prices, the downstream cartel markup is above
the competitive markup. Hence the quantity sold is lower with a cartel and upstream
profits are smaller.
With the LPC, the cartelists’ choice between buying inputs for Di from the efficient
supplier Ui and sourcing from the fringe depends not simply on whether input price wi
is below or above c, but also on the expected damage payments.
Recall the assumption that a LPC claim is valid only if trade with the cartelists takes
place. If wi = c and LPCi > 0, the cartelists prefer sourcing from the fringe as they pay
the same input price and avoid the damage payment. Hence the upstream firms have to
lower their prices below c to remain attractive.29
For LPCi > 0, the cartel profit from sourcing all inputs from U1 and U2 at uniform
prices of w1 = w2 = w is defined by (20). The cartel profit from sourcing input for D1
27This simplifies the exposition as otherwise one needs to explain how upstream firms account for how
their input prices affect downstream cartel margins and in turn the detection probability. That distracts
from the main point.
28This assumption is not completely innocuous. Intuitively, a downstream cartel puts additional pres-
sure on input prices. In particular, with homogenous downstream products the equilibrium upstream
prices equal 0 in case of joint downstream profit maximization because it does not matter which pro-
ducer’s product is sold more, except for the input price. Instead, upstream prices are positive in case of
downstream competition a la Cournot.
29Note that this logic also applies if the LPC is not payable to the suppliers, but instead to the
competition authority. This decoupling has been suggested by Polinsky and Che (1991) to avoid excessive
lawsuits (recall the discussion in the Introduction).
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from the fringe and input for D2 from U2 at w is
ΠALTD (p1, p2|w) ≡ (p1 − c) q1(p1, p2) + (p2 − w (1− α)) q2(p2, p1) − αpiN . (22)
The value of sourcing from U1 depends on the input price for product U2. In equilibrium,
it must be that
max
p1,p2
ΠD(p1, p2|w1 = w2 = w) = max
p1,p2
ΠALTD (p1, p2|w2 = w), (23)
i.e., for any price larger w charged by supplier Ui, the cartelists prefer to source the inputs
for Di from the fringe at price c and adjust sales prices accordingly.
Recall that without compensation and c sufficiently small, the equilibrium input prices
equal c. Hence there is no gain for the downstream cartelists from adjusting sales prices
when turning to the competitive fringe for one product. Instead, with the LPC and input
prices below c, the cartelists can profitably adjust prices:30 When deviating to source
inputs for D1 alternatively at price c, while continuing to source inputs for D2 at a price
w < c, the downstream cartelists under standard conditions (as with linear demand)
optimally raise the sales price on the high cost product of D1 and thus make a higher
profit on the low cost product of D2. Hence the attractiveness of the cartelists’ outside
option is higher once w < c. Intuitively, the more substitutable the downstream products
are, the more attractive this option becomes.
This logic yields a striking possibility: With the LPC in place, the expected profit of
a supplier may be lower than that earned without a compensation rule. This intuition
can be confirmed using the linear demand specification qi = 1/2− (β + γ) pi + γ p−i. For
large parameter ranges with a sufficiently high substitution intensity γ, the optimal input
prices without a compensation rule equal c and suppliers are worse off under the LPC,
whereas cartelists are better off. See Table 1 for the parametric results.
γ Upstream price (w) ΠU1(α = 1/2)/ΠU1(α = 0) ΠD(α = 1/2)/ΠD(α = 0)
0.5 0.04 104% 100%
1.65 0.02 100% 101%
4 0 83% 105%
5 −0.02 69% 108%
Table 1: Results for α = 0.5, β = 1, c = 0.05 and increasing degrees of downstream competition
(γ). Column 3 presents the supplier profit with the LPC relative to no LPC, Column 4 the ratio
of downstream cartel profits.
Proposition 7. Assume that there is a downstream cartel, each supplier Ui, i ∈ {1, 2},
can only supply downstream firm Di using linear tariffs, and the competitive fringe is
attractive (c sufficiently small). Compared to no compensation rule, the LPC decreases
consumer prices, but may increase cartel profits and hurt suppliers.
Intuitively, with two-part tariffs a supplier can make its offer more attractive by low-
ering the fixed fee and at the same time still offer optimal marginal price. In consequence,
30Even at prices of c and the LPC in place, in case of a deviation a price adjustment is profitable as
the effective input price when sourcing from a supplier Ui is c (1− α) instead of c.
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the rent shift between supplier and customer that is imposed by the LPC is simply coun-
teracted through the fixed fees and the LPC is neutral.
Proposition 8. Assume that there is a downstream cartel and each supplier Ui, i ∈ {1, 2},
can only supply downstream firm Di; two-part tariffs are feasible. If there is no competitive
fringe or it yields no LPC and α is exogenous, the LPC does not affect consumer prices
and expected profits, when compared to no compensation rule.
Proof. See Appendix.
5.1 Compensation when sourcing from the competitive fringe
Assume again that upstream tariffs are linear and, furthermore, that supplier Ui is com-
pensated with
max
[
0,
(
piN − β wi qi
)]
,
where β denotes the fraction of inputs for Di which the cartelists purchase from Ui,
and 1− β the fraction of inputs for Di which the cartelists purchase from the fringe. In
case of a positive expected compensation (assumed henceforth), sourcing one unit from the
fringe decreases cartel profits by c, whereas sourcing one unit from Ui decreases (expected)
profits by wi−αwi. The downstream cartelists are indifferent at wi = c/(1−α), so supplier
Ui can raise price above c, yielding equilibrium upstream prices of w∗ = c/(1−α) > c for
c sufficiently small. The expected supplier profit equals
w∗qi + α
[
piN − w∗qi
]
= c qi + αpiN .
For the cartelists, the effective input prices equal c as without any compensation rule.
Downstream cartelists are worse off compared to no compensation rule because they
additionally pay αpiN in expectation to the suppliers.
If α is independent of the cartel prices, i.e. α′(w) = 0, the resulting downstream prices
and quantities are as with no compensation rule. If α increases in the cartel markup, i.e.
α′(w) > 0, marginal cartel profits are lower, cartel prices lower and quantities higher.31
This benefits both consumers and suppliers. As analyzed in Subsection 4.5 for upstream
cartels, compensating for cartel damages even if no trade with the cartelists has taken
place is beneficial for consumers.
Proposition 9. Assume that there is a downstream cartel and each supplier Ui, i ∈
{1, 2}, can only supply downstream firm Di using linear tariffs. If there is an attractive
competitive fringe (c sufficiently small) and sourcing from also yields the LPC, the LPC
benefits suppliers and hurts the cartelists. Consumer prices decrease only if α increases
in the cartel mark-up and are unchanged otherwise.
31Note that the marginal profit of ΠD(p1, p2) =
∑
i∈{1,2}
{(
pi − wi
)
qi − αmax
[
0,
(
piN − β wi qi
)]}
with respect to pi is lower if ∂α/∂pi > 0 and the supplier has a loss due to the cartel.
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6 Extensions
6.1 Asymmetric information about the probability of compen-
sation
So far I have assumed that all firms know the detection probability α and are aware of its
public nature. This simplifies the exposition, but is not necessarily realistic. The opposite
extreme case considered by Block et al. (1981) is that purchasers of upstream cartelists
are agnostic about the possibility of a damage compensation, i.e., assess α with zero, and
cartelists are aware of this. Block et al. have shown that this can be beneficial for the
purchasers who than – incorrectly – take the nominal input price to be the effective one.
Hence, the cartelists cannot increase prices to neutralize the rebate, and in turn the cartel
profitability decreases also with the overcharge compensation, whereas purchasers benefit.
Besanko and Spulber (1990) have shown that the full neutrality of the overcharge
compensation derived by Baker (1988) and Salant (1987) can fail if the cartelists’ costs
are private knowledge: the purchasers are no more sure about the effective input, i.e.
whether it is due to high cost or a cartel overcharge. In turn cartelists have incentives to
moderate the price.
Yet, the major results presented in the present paper can be obtained also in case
of asymmetric information. To illustrate this, let us consider a simple example: The
cartelists know the true probability α of a compensation payment when there is a cartel,
whereas customers do not know whether collusion is implicit (read: legal, no compen-
sation claims) or explicit (a cartel, compensation claims). Suppose that it is common
knowledge that collusion is explicit with probability γ > 0. The customers thus expect a
compensation payment with probability αγ. Suppose further that the suppliers U1 and
U2 collude and there is an attractive competitive fringe (c sufficiently small), but there
is no compensation in case of alternative sourcing. If both U1 and U2 charge a (linear)
input price of c, the customers strictly prefer to source from U1 or U2 over sourcing from
the fringe: Only if they source from U1 or U2, they receive compensations with a positive
probability. Hence, the (linear) equilibrium price charged by the colluding suppliers is
above w, both in case of explicit and implicit collusion. Similarly, also the other adverse
effects stated in Subsection 4.1 hold for γ sufficiently large. Note that the compensa-
tion rule consequently also has adverse effects in case that collusion is indeed implicit.
The implicit colluders thus benefit from the umbrella of private enforcement of the cartel
prohibition.
Overall, it appears plausible that the trade partners of cartelists have at least some
knowledge (say, suspicion) of collusive behavior, and that the cartelists are aware of this.
Moreover, recall that the results of this paper also apply for a dominant firm that charges
excessive prices. For dominant firms it appears even more likely that their trade partners
are aware of excessive pricing, though there may be common uncertainty about whether
this can be proved in court (which is captured by α).
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6.2 Cartel stability
Private enforcement may cause substantial damage obligations to accumulate over time.
Eventually, the motive of avoiding discovery of evidence and by that avoiding paying
the damage obligations may thus become the dominating objective of the cartelists. If
the continuation of the cartel yields the highest discovery probability, there are thus
incentives for a cartel breakdown. A cartel breakdown may, however, facilitate cartel
detection because it causes price jumps which are suspicious for trade partners or the
competition authorities. In this case private enforcement can even stabilize the cartel as
defection from a cartel may become highly unprofitable. Yet, this logic also applies to
public fines, see Harrington (2004).32
A further investigation of cartel stability in the context of private enforcement is out
of the scope of this paper, but appears worthwhile for future research.
6.3 Endogenous detection
Recall that α denotes the probability of a damage compensation. This probability may
increase in the cartel price for several reasons. For example, providing convincing evidence
of a damage due a cartel may be easier when the markup is higher, so that lawsuits tend
to be more successful and more frequent than in case of low markups.
Moreover, the detection probability may increase with the cartel price. In a dynamic
setting, an increase in the cartel price today thus reduces expected future cartel profits.
Purchasers of the cartelists may though not perceive that as a discount on their sales
of today. Whinston (2006) shows that the neutrality result of Baker (1988) and Salant
(1987) for the case of OCC and monopolistic suppliers fails in this case.
The alleviating effect of an increase in the detection probability generally also applies
for the LPC studied in this paper, but the results are more robust than in the OCC case for
at least two reasons. First, the LPC is not just neutral, but the LPC can strictly decrease
allocative efficiency, benefit both upstream and downstream cartelists and hurt suppliers.
Hence, endogenizing the detection probability in a dynamic setting may weaken, but does
not necessarily overturn the result of strictly adverse effects. The second reason is slightly
more technical: The aforementioned results (in particular Propositions 2 and 4) occur
in case alternative sourcing is attractive. This involves corner solutions in the pricing
problems which persist when the marginal profits are slightly perturbed.
7 Conclusion
By establishing private damage compensation claims, the EU-Commission aims at in-
creasing the effectiveness of cartel deterrence, improving corrective justice by compensat-
ing those who suffered losses, and increasing efficiency. Forcing infringers to pay claimants
the profit lost due to the infringement is the ex-post measure that achieves full compensa-
tion. Indeed, European courts have stated that compensating lost profits is the norm and
32Straightforward is the argument that private damage compensation claims can reduce the incentives
for leniency applications, in particular if the applicant’s information is disclosed to private parties, making
it an easy target.
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also the EU-Commission has indicated to aim at full compensation. Moreover, Han et al.
(2008) have shown by means of an oligopoly model that the Overcharge Compensation can
be far away from actual losses due to a cartel. This favors the Lost Profit Compensation,
although it is often harder to compute than the Overcharge Compensation.
Investigating ex-ante incentives, I show in this paper that Lost Profit Compensation
claims of customers can have completely undesirable allocative effects: Expected cartel
profits as well as consumer prices can increase and suppliers of cartelists can be worse off
when entitled to compensation claims. The mechanism at work is that if anticipated, the
compensation payments from the cartelists to their trade partners are counterbalanced
through prices that are more favorable to the cartelists. The same logic applies to excessive
pricing of dominant firms.
These effects arise if there is fringe competition upstream in spite of the cartel, e.g., due
to imports or in-house production. If the cartel monopolizes the input market, instead,
the Lost Profit Compensation tends to provide socially desirable incentives and tends to
perform better than the Overcharge Compensation. The latter has already been studied
by Baker (1988) and Salant (1987) in a less general framework and has been confirmed
to be at worst neutral in terms of expected profits and consumer prices. As a policy
implication, the Overcharge Compensation is likely to be more desirable than the Lost
Profit Compensation in terms of ex-ante incentives if cartels and dominant firms are
expected to be unable to fully monopolize the market in most cases.
In the US, suppliers have been recognized as antitrust victims in some, but were denied
standing in other cases (Han et al., 2008). The legal treatment in the EU is still open. I
have pointed out that facilitating supplier claims can also have undesirable effects. Most
strikingly, in some cases it does not hurt, and in others it even benefits suppliers to not
have standing. In other words: Facilitating supplier damage claims may be intended to
benefit suppliers, but it may turn out to be a curse for them.
The arguments provided in this paper can be used to structure and stimulate the policy
discussion about ex-ante incentives of private compensation claims in case of competition
law infringements, in particular cartels and abuses of dominant positions. One should,
however, bear in mind that the adverse results are derived under two central assumptions.
The first is that damages can only be claimed if trade with the cartelists took place, so
that sourcing from the competitive fringe does not trigger compensation. This appears
to be realistic. Even if legally possible, it is highly likely that it is effectively much
harder or even infeasible to claim a commercial damage if one did not actually trade
with the cartelists. The second assumption is that the cartelists and their trade partners
rationally anticipate the compensation payments when trading. Informally speaking, this
means that there needs to be at least some suspicion in the industry that there could
be a cartel or an abuse of a dominant position and that damage claims have a chance
to succeed. This also appears plausible, and at the same time an interesting avenue for
empirical research.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 9. Let piN denote a supplier’s profit in case of downstream competi-
tion. When sourcing from supplier Ui, the downstream cartelists face a damage claim of
LPCi = max
{
0, piN − [wi qi(pi, p−i) + F i]
}
. For LPCi > 0, the profit of supplier Ui is
Πi =
(
wi qi + F i
)
(1− α) + αpiN . (24)
Downstream cartel profits when sourcing from U1 and U2 become
ΠD(p1, p2) =
∑
i∈{1,2}
{(
pi − wi (1− α)
)
qi − F i (1− α)− αpiN
}
. (25)
The cartelists’ profit when sourcing from Ui for Di and from the fringe for D − i is
ΠALTD (pi, p−i) =
(
pi − wi (1− α)
)
qi − F i (1− α)− αpiN + (p−i − c) q−i.
The cartelists are indifferent between the latter and sourcing both from U1 and U2 if
max
p1,p2
ΠALTD (p1, p2) = maxp1,p2 ΠD(p1, p2). (26)
To simplify this exposition, assume that α is exogenous. Let {p∗i , p∗−i} = maxp1,p2ΠD to
reduce (26) to
F i (1− α) = (p∗i−wi (1 + α)) qi+(p∗−i−w−i (1 + α)) q−i−F−i (1− α)−2αpiN−maxp1,p2 Π
ALT
D .
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Substituting F i in (24) yields
Πi = p∗i qi + (p∗−i − w−i (1 + α)) q−i − F−i (1− α)− αpiN −maxp1,p2 Π
ALT
D . (27)
The profit is maximized when the downstream cartelists face the true input costs. Observe
in (27) that for w−i = 0, it is profit maximizing to set wi = 0. Hence marginal upstream
prices of 0 are mutually best responses, independent of the value of α. Under symmetric
upstream tariffs with w1 = w2 = 0, the indifference condition (26) reduces to
F (1− α) = max
p1,p2
∑
i∈{1,2}
{pi qi} −max
p1,p2
{pi qi + (p−i − c) q−i} − αpiN
and
Πi = max
p1,p2
∑
i∈{1,2}
{pi qi} −max
p1,p2
{pi qi + (p−i − c) q−i} , (28)
which is independent of α. Hence the LPC is neutral in terms of consumer prices and
expected profits.
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